We present private secure coded computation that ensures both the master's privacy and data security against the workers, where the master aims to compute a function of its private data and a specific data in a library exclusively owned by the external workers. For privacy, the master should conceal the index of the specific data in the library against the workers. For security, the master should encrypt its private data. As an achievable scheme, we propose private secure polynomial codes and compare the proposed scheme with private polynomial codes in private coded computation and the optimal scheme of robust private information retrieval (RPIR).
I. INTRODUCTION
I N A distributed computing system, some slow workers are bottleneck of the fast computation. With an erasure code e.g. MDS code, the effect of these slow workers can be reduced, which is referred to as coded computation [1] . Several follow-up studies of coded computation were proposed [2] - [4] .
As a variation of coded computation, the security on the master's data was considered in coded computation, which was referred to as secure coded computation [5] - [7] . In [8] , the master's privacy was considered, where the master aims to compute a function of its private data and a specific data in a data library exclusively owned by the external workers, which was referred to as private coded computation. Note that in Lagrange coded computing (LCC) [7] , the master's privacy was considered for protecting the content of master's data against colluding workers. That is, the master's privacy considered in [7] is equivalent to the security in secure coded computation, and it is different from the master's privacy considered in private coded computation.
In this letter, we present private secure coded computation that ensures both the master's privacy and data security against the workers, as a new variation of coded computation. We consider the security in secure coded computation and the master's Manuscript received July 3, 2019; accepted August 1, 2019 privacy in private coded computation. Specifically, we consider a coded matrix multiplication. The overall process of private secure coded computation is depicted in Fig. 1 . There are N non-colluding workers
Let g W i and h W i denote an encoding function of the master for the worker W i and that of W i itself, respectively. The master encodes its private matrix A into g W i (A) = C i and sends to W i . The master also sends the queries Q i , and the worker W i encodes B into h W i (B) and computes 
We present a motivating example of the private secure coded computation. There is a mobile user who uses artificial intelligence (AI) assistant, e.g. Google Assistant or Apple Siri. The assistant provides a recommendation service and there are M categories that the user can choose, e.g. movies, games, restaurants, and so on. The data matrices for M categories are denoted by {B k } M k=1 and they comprise the library B. We assume that the library is not owned by the user but the external workers which are controlled by the assistant. With its preference parameter matrix A, the user orders the assistant to recommend an item in a specific category B D where D ∈ [M ]. Note that the user encrypts A so that the assistant acquires no information of A, thus implying that the data security on A is ensured. When ordered, the assistant instructs the external workers to compute a multiplication AB D and decides its recommendation based on AB D . For the user's privacy, the assistant does not reveal the index of the aimed matrix D to the workers and the workers also should not identify D from the assistant's instructions.
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Usually, the user uses the recommendation service according to its life style. Therefore, if the workers identify D and record the timeline, they acquire the information about the user's life style and invade the user's privacy on its life style.
As an achievable scheme, we propose private secure polynomial codes (PSPC), based on polynomial codes [9] . We compare the proposed scheme with uncoded scheme, private polynomial codes (PPC) in [8] , and the optimal scheme of robust private information retrieval (RPIR) [10] , with respect to computation time and communication load which are defined as follows.
Definition 1: In private secure coded computation, communication load U is defined by the amount of communication from the master to all of the workers.
Definition 2: In private secure coded computation, computation time T is defined by the time taken for the workers to compute the sufficient number of multiplications so that the master recovers the whole multiplication AB D .
For the computation time, we assume that the workers simultaneously start working. We also assume that the sizes of A and each B k are sufficiently large so that the encoding time at the master or the workers is negligible compared to the time taken for multiplication. For the communication load, the communication from the workers to the master is excluded since the effect of returning load on overall runtime varies for different schemes.
Notation: An integer set from 1 to N is denoted by [N ] and a set from N to M is denoted by [N : M ].
II. PRIVATE SECURE POLYNOMIAL CODES A. Illustrative Example
A master's private matrix is denoted by A ∈ F r×s q for sufficiently large finite field F q . There are 12 non-colluding workers {W i } 12 i=1 who do not communicate with each other and share a library B of two matrices B 1 , B 2 ∈ F s×t q . The master needs to compute AB 1 . For the matrices A 0 , 2 . At first, the master randomly chooses 13 distinct points
For each worker W i , the master computes and transmitsÃ(x i ) which is given bỹ
is a random matrix for ensuring data security on A.
WithÃ(x i ), the master also transmits queries Q i that order W i to encode the library B intoB(
Each worker W i computes and returns a multiplication which is given bỹ where {Z l } 8 l=0 are given by
Since the degree of polynomialÃ(x)B(x) is 8 and 13 points {x i } 13 i=1 are distinct from each other, the master can interpolate the polynomial after the 9 fastest workers return their results and the multiplication AB 1 can be recovered from the coefficients Z 3 , Z 4 , Z 6 , and Z 7 .
Remark 1: In PSPC, we may consider some adversarial workers who return erroneous results, as well as the stragglers. For example, in the above example, we assume that up to one worker is adversarial. In this case, the master should employ Reed-Solomon decoding, instead of polynomial interpolation. Moreover, the master needs two more multiplications for decoding, which delays the process. In general, if there are E adversarial workers, the master should receive 2E more multiplications from the workers.
B. General Description
The overall process of PSPC is depicted in Fig. 2 
where R ∈ F r/m×s q is a random matrix for ensuring data security on A.
WithÃ(x i ), the master also transmits queries Q i that order W i to encode the library B intõ
whereB k (x) is given bỹ
Each worker W i computes and returns a multiplication which is given bỹ
where {Z l } mn+m+n l=0 are given by
Since the degree of polynomialÃ(x)B(x) is mn + m + n and the points {x i } N i=1 are distinct from each other, the master can interpolate the polynomial after the (m + 1)(n + 1) fastest workers return their results and the multiplication AB D can be recovered from the coefficients {Z l |l ∈ [p(m+1) : p(m+1)+ m − 1], p ∈ [n]}.
Remark 2: WhereasB k (x) = n−1 l=0 B k,l x l(m+1) in the conventional polynomial codes in [9] , there is no B k,0 x 0 term in PSPC, as seen in (5) . This is because the coefficient of x 0 in polynomialB(x) should be the undesired term (4) . If there is B k,0 x 0 for each B k , the desired submatrix B D,0 cannot be obtained by decoding since the undesired term k∈[M]\DB k (x j k ) is combined with B D,0 . That is, in PSPC, we sacrifice the term B D,0 for the master's privacy, which can be seen as privacy cost.
C. Performance Analysis
In this section, we derive the computation time and the communication load of PSPC accroding to Definition 1 and 2. We assume that the computation time distribution of each worker is independent of each other, and follows the shiftedexponential distribution as in [1] . The computation time T P SP C is given by
), (6) where μ and γ denotes straggling parameter and shift parameter, respectively.
For the communication load U P SP C , let |A| denote the communication load for transmitting A. Since the amount of encoded A for each worker W i is given by (3), we have U P SP C = N |A|/m. (7) Remark 3: Recalling that the master needs (m + 1)(n + 1) multiplications from N workers, (m + 1)(n + 1) ≤ N . Therefore, for reducing U P SP C , the master maximizes m under m ≤ N/(n + 1) − 1. On the other hand, since the parameters μ and γ also affect T P SP C , it is difficult to generally characterize the effects of m and n on T P SP C .
D. Privacy and Security Proof
We prove that (1) and (2) are satisfied for every worker. By the chain rule, we can write (1) as follows.
First, let us consider C i . If the worker W i recognizes thatÃ(x) is evaluated at x i , it will identify the desired index D sinceÃ(x) andB D (x) is evaluated at the same point. However, recalling that C i is encrypted by the random matrix R, the worker W i cannot infer x i from C i , thus implying that I(D; C i |Q i , B) = 0.
Next, we consider B. Recalling that the master determines D without obtaining any information of B, B is independent of D, thus implying that I(D; B|Q D i ) = 0. Finally, we consider Q i . The queries Q i are fourfold : partitioning each B k into n submatrices, evaluating each B k (x), summing them into one equation (4) , and multiplying the equation (4) by C i . Since the others are fixed operations and do not carry any information, we only consider the evaluating operation. As assumed, the master randomly chooses M distinct points x i and {x j k |k ∈ [M ] \ D} for the worker W i who does not communicate with other workers. As a result, the worker W i observes the points x i and {x j k |k ∈ [M ] \ D} as indistinguishable random points, thus implying that I(D; Q i ) = 0.
We now prove (2) . We can write (2) as follows. 
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
We compare PSPC, uncoded scheme, private polynomial codes (PPC) in [8] , and optimal RPIR scheme in [10] with respect to the computation time and communication load. In the uncoded scheme, the master orders each worker to compute
where R is a random matrix. After the fastest worker returns M multiplications, the master obtains AB D .
For PPC in [8] , we choose two special cases-private oneshot polynomial codes (POPC) and private asynchronous polynomial codes (PAPC). In POPC, each worker returns only one matrix multiplication results, same as PSPC. On the other hand, in PAPC, several smaller multiplication tasks are assigned to each worker, and by assigning sufficient number of multiplications to each worker, every worker continues working throughout the process. For ensuring the data security in POPC and PAPC, the random matrix R is added when encoding A, similar to PSPC.
The optimal RPIR scheme in [10] minimizes the amount of download when the master does not have A and merely downloads B D while concealing the index D against the workers. We modifies the optimal RPIR scheme for coded computation by considering A at the master side. Similar to PSPC, for the data security, the master sends A + R in the modified optimal RPIR scheme. For the performance analysis of POPC, PAPC and the optimal RPIR scheme, we employ the analysis technique in Section IV of [8] .
A. Computation Time
As in Section II-C, we assume that the computation time distribution of each worker is independent of each other, and follows the shifted-exponential distribution as in [1] . For uncoded scheme, the computation time is given by
For other schemes, we employ the computation times given in Section IV of [8] .
We compare the computation time for given N, M, γ and varying μ. That is, N = 12, M = 4, γ = 0.1 and μ is varied from 10 −1 to 10. Since μ is a straggling parameter, larger μ implies that the effect of stragglers becomes negligible. Let K denote the minimum number of returned multiplications to recover AB D . For fair comparison, we optimize K for each scheme so that each scheme achieves the fastest computation time for given N, M, γ and μ.
As seen in Fig. 3 , the uncoded scheme is the worst and PSPC outperforms POPC. The intuition of this dominance is explained in Remark 4. The modified optimal RPIR scheme is the second fastest. This is because the original optimal RPIR scheme achieves the minimum amount of download when the master privately downloads B D without considering A. However, in our problem setting, the master should jointly consider both A and B. Furthermore, since the modified optimal RPIR scheme is synchronous scheme, PAPC achieves the fastest computation time where the workers are exploited more efficiently due to its asynchronous manner.
B. Communication Load
Let U uncoded , U RP IR , U P OP C , and U P AP C denote the communication load of uncoded scheme, optimal RPIR scheme, POPC, and PAPC, respectively. It is obvious that U uncoded = N |A|. According to the analysis given in Section IV of [8] , we have U RP IR = N |A|, U P OP C = N |A|/m, and U P AP C = LN |A|/m, where L denotes the number of multiplications assigned to each worker in PAPC. Therefore, from (7), the following holds generally.
U uncoded = U RP IR ≥ U P AP C > U P OP C = U P SP C .
Consequently, PSPC achieves the smallest communication load and strictly faster computation time than POPC.
Remark 4: Unlike PSPC, the workers should be grouped in POPC, which delays the computation time. We explain the cause of grouping in PPC which inlcude POPC. Since A is not encrypted in the original PPC in [8] , the worker W i may infer x i fromÃ(x i ). Therefore, if B D is encoded with the same point x i , the worker W i identifies D. As a result, in PPC, A and B are separately encoded intoÃ(x) andB(y), respectively, and the master should decodeÃ(x)B(y). Accordingly, the decoding is two step process: the interpolation of polynomials in x followed by that in y. For decoding A(x) whose degree is m, there should be at least m + 1 distinct evaluations {Ã(x i )B(y t )} m+1 i=1 for given y t . As a result, in PPC, the workers are divided into groups according to the evaluating point ofB(y), and the computation time is determined by the slowest group, thus implying that POPC is slower than PSPC.
